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Die Charakterisirung des Menschen als eines 
vernünftiges Thieres liegt schon in der Gestalt 
und Organisation seiner Hand, seiner Finger	
und Fingerspitzen,	deren theils Bau, theils zar-
tes Gefühl, dadurch die Natur ihn nicht für eine 
Art der Handhabung der Sachen, sondern un-
bestimmt für alle, mithin für den Gebrauch der 
Vernunft geschickt macht, und dadurch die 
technische oder Geschicklichkeitsanlage seiner 
Gattung al seines vernünftigen	 Thieres be-
zeichnet hat (Kant	1880,	255). 
1. Introduction: The Question of Man in the Light of the Philo-
sophical Anthropology and Its Relationship with Science
Since	the	rise	of	the	philosophical	anthropology	the	question	of	man	has	been	
addressed	 in	 a	renewed	way	 in	 respect	 of	 the	classically	 philosophical	 tradi-
tion.	The	distinctive	aspect	of	the	innovation	is	of	course	the	strengthening	of	
the	 relationship	 with	 science:	 the	 philosophical	consideration	of	man	cannot	
put	aside	the	urgency	of	a	confrontation	with	the	most	recent	results	achieved	
in	 the	 field	of	 those	sciences	concerning	man	as	 a	scientific	object.	 It	 follows	
that	the	worth	of	the	philosophical	analysis	depends	on	the	possibility	of	vali-
dating	 the	 philosophical	 statements,	 taking	 in	 consideration	 their	 scientific	
coherence.	
This	 methodological	 issue	 seems	 to	 represent	 a	 precise	 heritage	 of	 the	 old	
Kantianism,	according	to	which	between	the	transcendental	method	–	i.	e.	phi-
losophy	–	and	the	mathematical	physics	–	i.	e.	science	–	ran	a	precise	intercon-
nection.	 Hence	 the	 epistemological	 status	 of	 the	 philosophical	 anthropology	
seems	 to	 be	 comparable	 with	 that	 of	 the	 upheld	 “particular	 metaphysics	 of	
nature”	 in	 Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (Kant	 1911,	







and	 reaches	 an	 abstracter	 and	 comprehensive	 explanation.	 Its	 main	 achieve-
ment	could	 indeed	summed	up	in	a	general	definition	of	 the	essence	of	man,	
even	 though	 this	 essence	 has	 completely	 lost	 its	 metaphysical	 configuration	
and	presents	itself	with	a	dynamical	tension.	This	inner	tendency	can	be	con-
sidered	as	a	shared	presumption	by	all	the	authors,	and	can	be	reconstructed	
starting	 from	 an	 apparently	 divergent	 opinion,	 upheld	 by	 the	 biologist	 Jakob	




trast	 with	 the	 generally	 anthropocentric	 argument	 of	 the	 “animal	 rationale”,
and	seems	to	refute	the	difference	between	“man”	and	“animal”	–	which	they
are	both	now	capable	of	 forming	 their	own	world	–,	we	must	notice	 that	 the
capacity	 of	 building	 the	 different	 connections	 laying	 the	 foundations	 of	 the
different	“environments”,	reveals	a	different	degree	of	 freedom	in	 the	human
sphere.	 In	 respect	 of	 Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen,
Adolf	 Portmann	 (Portmann	 1956,	 10-11)	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 this	 human
specificity	 consists	 in	 the	 individuation	 of	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 “comprehending”
(Verstehen	 or	 Verstehensmöglichkeit),	 because	 the	 circumstance	 that	 in	 the
same	species	rises	up	the	possibility	of	discerning	between	the	different	sorts
of	connections	and	environment	building	(the	oak	of	the	old	man,	the	oak	of	a
young	 boy,	 the	 ray	 of	 light	 of	 the	 physicist	 and	 that	 of	 the	 physiologist	 etc.;
Kriszat-von	Uexküll	1956,	94-101),	can	be	solely	explained	by	bearing	in	mind
the	 general	 form	 of	 intentionality,	 according	 to	 which	 the	 different	 “world”
shapes	can	be	derived.	In	a	few	words,	a	new	level	of	acquaintance	seems	to	be
gained,	in	the	human	dimension,	as	regard	the	world	forming	capacity.
The	 possibility	 of	 reaching	 the	 unity	 of	 meaning,	 which	 is	 witnessed	 by	 von
Uexküll	 by	 recalling	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 unity	 of	 nature	 behind	 the	 apparent
diversity	of	the	different	natures	of	the	chemist,	of	the	physicist	etc.	(Kriszat-
von	Uexküll	1956,	101),	 is	 the	decisive	step	allowing	us	to	 figure	out	the	hu-
man	 “interior	 world”	 (Innenwelt)	 as	 a	 symbolic	 one.	 In	 von	 Uexküll’s	 theory,
there	is,	as	we	have	stated	before,	a	precise	degree	of	freedom	for	each	species,
insofar	as	between	«Merkwelt»	and	«Wirkwelt»	takes	place	the	«Innenwelt»,	a
special	 answer	 of	 the	 living	 being	 to	 the	 stimuli	 coming	 from	 the	 external
world	(Merkwelt).	Through	the	action	of	this	interior	world,	the	external	envi-
ronment	seems	 to	be	shaped	by	an	 inner	power	of	 the	 living	being,	which	 is
however	 specific	 to	 every	 different	 living	 being.	This	means	 that	 in	 principle
every	shaped	world	is	different	from	the	other	(there	is	no	common	world	to
birds	 in	 general,	 but	 solely	 the	 hawk’s	 world,	 the	 eagle’s	 world	 etc.).	 Hence
Portmann,	 as	 we	have	clarified	 before,	 underlines	 that	 the	 danger	 lies	 in	 the
attempt	 to	 acritically	 apply	 the	 Umwelt	 theory	 to	man,	since	 the	unity	 of	 the
comprehension	has	been	discovered.	The	predominance	of	the	unity	of	mean-







cal	 activity	 solely	 take	 place	 within	 this	 distance:	 if	 we	 can	 for	 sure	 take	 for	
granted	that	the	world	of	a	young	man	is	not	the	same	world	of	a	skilled	physi-
cian,	we	can	at	the	same	time	depict	the	general	form	of	the	connection	lead-
ing	 to	 the	 particularization	 of	 each	 environment.	 This	 implies	 that	 we	 must	





philosophical	 anthropologists	 and	 of	 the	 transcendental	 philosophy,	 it	 will	
endorse	 a	 confrontation	 of	 the	 philosophical	 theory	 with	 science’s	 achieve-
ments:	I	should	particularly	show,	from	the	one	hand,	how	much	the	capacity	







is	 the	 following.	 From	 the	 transcendental	 point	 of	 view,	 it	 should	 always	 be	
possible	 to	 describe	 a	 “metaphysical”	 theory	 which	 is	 prior	 to	science,	 but	 it	
cannot	leave	behind	the	reference	to	scientific	data	and	results.	However,	sci-
ence	 is	 always	 in	 progress	 and	 goes	 through	 both	 paradigmatic	 and	 specific	
changes:	the	question	is	here	whether	to	this	mutations	in	the	scientific	field	
do	correspond	some	modifications	of	the	philosophical	system	of	knowledge.	
Cassirer’s	 answer	 to	 this	 tough	 problem	 is	 that	 these	 modifications	 are	 not	
only	possible,	but	also	necessary,	because	the	history	of	science	is	the	history	
of	the	discovery	of	the	a priori functions	of	reason;	according	to	this	approach,	
the	 logical	 structures	 of	 reason	 reveal	 themselves	 through	 the	 evolution	 of	
science,	and	thus	they	can	apparently	change,	but	at	the	end	of	this	process	we	
can	 always	 find	 something	 which	 is	 pretty	 stable	 and	 that	 can	 just	 be	 envis-
aged	 as	 an	 a priori (Cohen	 1987,	 B6/C10;	 Cassirer	 1999,	 13).	 Nevertheless,	




occurred.	 Even	 though	 Cassirer	 himself	 has	 faced	 the	 consequences	 of	 this	
dynamics	of	the	a priori	(see	Ferrari	2003,	142-148),	the	task	of	comparing	the	
metaphysical	 part	 of	 the	 system	 with	 what	 comes	 from	 scientific	 knowledge	
can	 never	 be	 considered	 as	 an	 ended	 task.	 The	 open	 confrontation	 between	



















rer	 died	 in	 1945.	 Leroi-Gourhan’s	 pivotal	 book	 –	 Gesture and Speech –	 is	 not	
only	 a	 document	 in	 which	 the	 palaeontological	 research	 was	 brilliantly	 and	
profoundly	 explained,	 but	 also	 a	 magnificent	 compendium	 of	 philosophical	
anthropology.	The	study	of	the	human	evolution	affords	him	the	possibility	of	
describing,	alongside	the	punctual	explanation	of	the	development	of	the	ana-
tomical	 and	 physiological	 characteristics	 of	 the	 species,	 the	 inner	 process	




skull,	 to	 the	 invention	 of	 graphism,	 we	 can	 follow	 all	 the	 progressive	 libera-
tions	that,	starting	from	biology,	culminate	in	the	final	stage	of	a	spiritual	di-
mension,	 into	 which	 the	 relationship	 with	 the	 external	 world	 is	 guided	 by	
symbols.	
This	does	neither	mean	of	course	that	we	will	exclusively	focus	on	the	attempt	
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becomes	 able	 to	 manipulate	 reality	 through	 the	 fabrication	 of	 complicated	
artifacts;	as	third	moment,	we	will	observe	the	emergence	of	the	first	form	of	
socialization	 and	 so	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 primitive	 culture,	 which	 has	 been	 made	













2. The Threshold-Argument and the Definition of Man as “Ani-
mal Symbolicum”
Cassirer’s	“animal symbolicum”	clearly	has	a	continuous	relationship	with	the	
classic	 philosophical	 definition	 of	 “animal rationale”.	 From	 a	 logical	 point	 of	






is	 a	 basic	 form	 of	 life	 corresponding	 to	 the	 position	 of	 man,	 whose	 access	 is	
denied	 to	 all	 other	 forms	 of	 living	 beings.	 Furthermore,	 both	 the	 definitions	
imply	an	anthropocentric	position,	even	though	the	“animal symbolicum”	does	
not	share	the	metaphysical	implications	of	the	“animal rationale”	and	appears	
to	 be	 scientifically	 proved2:	 the	 symbolic	 tension	 as	 constitutive	 element	 of	
1	On	this	classical	topic	of	the	philosophical	anthropology	(see:	Schacht	2015,	56).	
2	When	 we	 are	 saying	 “scientifically	 proved”,	 we	 mean	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 definition	 of	
“animal symbolicum”	is	argued	moving	from	the	scientific	context.	Hence	the	structure	
of	the	argument	is	strictly	phenomenological:	the	starting	point	is	the	analysis	of	the	
animal	 behaviour	 and	 language,	 about	 which	 no	 symbolical	 dimension	 seems	 to	 be	
upheld.	This	can	be	explained	by	recalling	the	incapacity	of	animals	to	withhold	their	









human	 identity	 is	 indeed	 derived	 from	 a	 precise	 comparison	 with	 modern	
biology	and	psychology,	especially	with	Jakob	von	Uexküll	and	Wolfgang	Köh-
ler,	 and	 with	 neurophysiology,	 considering	 the	 intellectual	 relationship	 that	
Cassirer	had	with	Kurt	Goldstein.	
3. Metaphysical Biology or Biological Metaphysics? 
	
In	Cassirer’s	anthropology,	the	scientific	basis	of	the	definition	of	“animal sym-
bolicum”	 is	 particularly	 clear.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 approach	 appears	 to	 be	
conditioned	by	the	transcendental	point	of	view.	According	to	Cassirer’s	view,	
life	is	an	immediate	whole,	where	man’s	activity	is	characterized	by	shaping	a	
transcendent	 level	 into	 the	 immanence	 of	 life	 –	 on	 the	 latter	 point	 Cassirer	
himself	 quotes	 Simmel	 (1922,	 13).	 This	 kind	 of	 representation	 prevents	 us	
from	strictly	overcoming	phenomenal	experience,	but	it	also	allows	us	to	take	
into	 account	 the	 specific	 activity	 of	 man	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 nature:	 as	 a	 conse-




ics	 of	 symbolic	 forms,	 the	 distinction	 between	 «Geist»	und	 «Leben»	 seems	to	
speak	in	favour	of	a	separation	between	metaphysics	and	biology,	but	the	phe-
nomenological	 approach	 heads	 in	 a	 different	 direction	 (Itzkoff	 1971,	 175).	
Geist means,	in	fact,	not	a	higher	dimension	than	the	immediateness	of	Leben,	
but	rather	a	different	consciousness	of	the	unity	of	life	(Sissel	Hoel	2012,	73):	
The	essence	of	 the	 fully	concrete	 life	“is	(not	something	which	 is	
added	 to	 its	 own	 being,	 but	 something	 building	 its	 own	 being);	
that	transcendence	is	immanent	to	it”.	In	this	inner	and	necessary	






Hence,	 we	 can	 argue	 that	 Cassirer’s	 point	 of	 view	 can	 be	 interpreted	 in	 the	















uniqueness	 of	 life,	 but	 showing	 how	 man’s	 activity	 opens	 up	 a	 space	 for	 the	
determination	 of	 a	 transcendent	 window,	 within	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 immanent	
living	(Sissel	Hoel	2012,	78;	86–89;	Renz	2002,	266-272).	Accordingly,	“spirit”	
is	the	name	describing	the	consciousness	of	the	mediated	character	of	the	im-









4. The Difference Between “Rational” and “Symbolic” and the 
Meta-Environmental Character of Human Acting 
	
At	 this	 stage	 of	 argumentation	 we	 must	 point	 out	 a	 difference	 running	 be-
tween	 the	 concept	 of	 “rational”	 and	 that	 of	 “symbolic”,	 as	 regard	 Cassirer’s	





position	 in	 the	 continuity	 of	 the	 living.	 What	 is	 rational	 is	 not	 a	 particular	
product	or	even	a	universal	shape	of	logos (speech,	thought	etc.),	but	 logos in	
its	own	activity.	On	the	other	hand,	it	 is	clear	that	Cassirer	wanted	to	 lay	the	





















gained	 by	 palaeontology	 is	 then	 different	 from	 the	 classically	 philosophical	
one,	 since	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 are	 not	 merely	 logic,	 but	 it	 generally	
complies	 with	 the	 higher	 principles	 of	 transcendental	 mentality.	 Still,	 this	 is	
not	the	point;	indeed,	the	palaeontological	interpretation	gives	us	new	tools	to	
better	reconsider	Cassirer’s	definition.	
In	 the	spirit	of	 transcendental	mentality,	 the	confrontation	with	science	 is	 in	
















succession	of	 the	evolutionary	stages	of	man	seems	to	validate	 	 the	vision	of	
the	 symbolic	 activity	 as	characterizing	 aspect	 of	 human	 acting	 (Itzkoff	 1971,	
174–175).	









the	 liberation	 from	 all	 those	 biological	 tasks	 accomplished	 by	 paws	 in	 other	
animals.	 This	 notion	of	 “liberation”,	 which	 seems	 to	 share	 an	 important	 con-
cordance	with	Gehlen’s	Entlastung (Gehlen	1988,	54-65),	means	that	the	func-















two	stages	of	 the	whole	process:	 i)	 the	biological	 liberation;	 ii)	and	the	 free-
dom	from	biology.	 It	 is	 important	to	stress	the	difference	between	these	mo-
ments:	on	the	one	hand,	the	biological	liberation	only	means	that	a	first	grade	
of	independence	is	already	realized	within	the	biological	structure;	on	the	oth-
er	 hand,	 the	 freedom	 of	 the	 hand	 entails	 the	 liberation	 of	 a	 specific	 kind	 of	
gesture,	 having	 no	 resemblance	 with	 the	 animal	 world,	 and	 whose	 conse-
quences	are	far	from	being	clear	in	these	first	steps.	
This	 authentically	 biological	 foundation	 of	 culture	 as	 natural	 dimension	 of	
humanity	gives	us	the	starting	point	to	envisage	a	general	theory	of	symbolic	
activity	as	 characterizing	element	of	humanity.	Technology	might	 then	be	 in-
terpreted	as	another	face	of	the	same	symbolic	coin.	The	technological	activity	
is	that	specific	form	of	acting	embodied	in	a	freed	hand,	whose	symbolic	mean-
ing	consists	of	 the	 liberation	of	 the	human	gesture	from	the	biological	envel-
opment	of	man’s	body.	Furthermore,	technology	promptly	compels	us	to	think	
in	symbolic	terms.	The	fabrication	of	a	tool	is	 indeed	directly	connected	with	




dom	of	 the	hand	sets	out	 the	conditions	of	 the	 technological	activity,	but	 the	
technological	activity	is	basically	symbolical,	implying	the	meta-environmental	
element.	 This	 meta-environmental	 element	 is	 actually	 original,	 even	 though	




In	 turn,	 the	 rise	 of	 rationality	 as	 distinctive	 attribute	 of	 man	 is	 in	 any	 case	
strictly	 connected	 to	 the	 anatomical	 evolution,	 since	 the	 adaptation	 of	 the	
skeleton	to	the	erect	posture	causes	modifications	in	the	conformation	of	the	
skull.	 The	 spreading	 of	 the	 cortical	 fan	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	 adaptation	 of	 the	
























6. Biology of Society and Philosophy of Culture 
	
Leroi-Gourhan’s	anthropology	must	be	interpreted	in	the	light	of	a	metaphysi-
cal	 biology,	 but	 the	 peculiar	 upturning	 originated	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 human	
consociations	 confirms	 the	 exceptional	 character	 of	 human	 culture:	 here	 the	
rhythms	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 humanity	 as	 phylum have	 been	 overcome	 by	 an	
autonomous	 orientation.	 The	 idea	 of	 biology	 of	 technology	 entails	 a	 double	
level	of	liberation	(nature-society-culture),	since	biology	of	society	compels	us	
to	 recognize	 that	 the	 evolution	 of	 human	 societies	 follow	 a	 specific	 rhythm,	
which	is	at	the	same	time	a	reflection	and	an	independent	reconfiguration	of	
biological	 evolution.	 The	 problem	 concerns	 how	 much	 of	 the	 biological	
rhythms	 penetrates	 into	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 societies,	 considering	
that	the	analysis	of	technology	shows	the	possibility	of	individuating	an	evolu-
tionary	 progress	 which	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 biological	 evolution6.	 Leroi-Gourhan	
introduces	 the	 question	of	 biology	 of	 society	 and	of	 biology	 of	 technology	 in	
the	fifth	chapter	of	Technics and Language (Leroi-Gourhan	1993,	I,	145-147).	
In	order	to	find	a	definition	of	biology	of	society	and	of	biology	of	technology,	
we	must	 take	 into	account	two	excerpts	of	Memory and Rhythms:	 i)	 “This	en-
meshing	of	 tools	and	gestures	 in	organs	extraneous	to	the	human	has	all	 the	
characteristics	 of	 biological	 evolution	 because,	 like	 cerebral	 evolution,	 it	 de-
velops	 in	 time	 through	 the	 addition	 of	 elements	 that	 improve	 the	 operation	
























side by	 species	 adaptation”	 (Leroi-Gourhan	 1993,	 II,	 235).	 One	 can	 observe	
this	passage	in	Cassirer	too,	since	the	anthropological	turn	and	the	question	of	
the	 phenomenology	 of	 life	 brings	 to	 a	 reconsideration	 of	 the	 three-way	 divi-
sion	 of	 Philosophie der symbolischen Formen:	 Ausdruck (expression), Darstel-
lung (representation)	and	reine Bedeutung (pure	meaning),	in	favour	of	a	func-
tional	 dialectics	 of	 Ausdruck (Plümacher	 1996,	 136-138;	 Möckel	 2005,	 340-
343).	
Nevertheless,	human	intelligence	implies	a	third	 level	of	emancipation	acting	
on	 the	 consolidation	 of	 the	 mechanical	 operational	 sequences:	 the	 organiza-
tion	 of	 brain	 is	 so	 complex,	 to	 the	 point	 that	 the	 selection	 and	 the	 choice	
among	these	sequences	has	reached	a	high	degree	of	freedom	in	respect	both	
of	the	phyletic	heritage	and	of	the	social	transmission	(Leroi-Gourhan	1993,	I,	
145-147;	 II,	 219-236).	 From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 one	 can	 undoubtedly	 affirm	
that	the	very	realm	of	humanity	is	the	world	of	culture	(Cassirer	1944,	87-96;	
Bayer	2001,	45-46).	
7. The Ontological Grounding of Future 
	
The	 settlement	 of	 a	 symbolics	 of	 the	 technical	 gesture	 leaves	 room	 for	 a	
chronological	analysis	of	human	acting.	Indeed,	the	meta-environmental	char-
acter	of	man’s	activity	implies	a	peculiar	orientation	of	every	gesture	toward	
what	 is	 not	 immediately	 present.	 Human	 activity	 always	 recalls	 something	
which	is	not	“on	hand”.	































From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 chronological	 determination	 of	 man	
appears	 to	 be	 clearly	 oriented	 toward	 the	 future.	 This	 spreading	 is	 directly	
connected	to	the	technological	manipulation	of	signs,	because,	as	we	have	al-
ready	seen,	 the	creation	of	signs	implies	their	constant	availability.	Futuristic	






























third	 specific	 form	 of	 human	 acting.	 Nevertheless,	 as	 I	 have	 already	 pointed	
out,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 hold	 the	 distinction	 between	 biological	 liberation	 and	
freedom	 from	 biology:	 the	 first	 is	 the	 result	 of	 a	 bio-mechanical	 process,	
whereas	the	latter	is	the	consequence	of	this	process.	The	step	made	from	the	








the	 same	 definition	 of	 natural	 being	 is	 somehow	 arguable	 only	 according	 to	
these	technical	terms.	Knowledge	is	genealogically	linked	to	the	technological	
manipulation,	 since	 beings	 solely	 become	 knowable	 within	 the	 reference	 of	
thing	 to	 that	 idea	 working	 as	 paradigm.	 The	 knowability	 function	 is	 imple-
mented	by	demiurge’s	action,	which	puts	into	things	the	reference	to	an	ideal	
meaning,	and	made	them	signs	of	ideas	–	according	to	Plato’s	Timaeus,	things	
are	ta dia nou dedēmiourgēmena (Tim. 47e4).	The	production	and	the	creation	
of	 a	 thing	 as	 sign8	is	 of	 course	 metaphoric,	 but	 it	 represents	 the	 final	 philo-
sophical	transposition	of	the	technical	gesture.	However,	the	shape	of	the	par-
adigmatic	 structure	 is	crucial	 as	 well.	 It	 is	 not	 by	chance	 that	 Leroi-Gourhan	
depicts	the	question	of	technology	through	the	reference	to	the	lithic	industry,	












faculty	 and	 the	 linguistic	 one,	 until	 the	 point	 that	 the	 parallelism	 tool-word	










34-36):	 they	 are	 the	 instruments	 of	 the	 symbolic	 manipulation	 of	 reality.	
Words	allow	man	to	free	himself	from	the	environmental	context,	because	they	
allude	to	the	possibility	of	abstract	meanings,	and	can	be	considered	valid	not	
only	 within	 the	 situation	 into	 which	 they	 are	 arisen	 and	 used,	 but	 they	 are	
henceforward	 available	 to	 all	 those	 who	 will	 be	 able	 to	 put	 that	 use	 in	 their	
own	hands.	Moreover,	the	consolidation	of	a	vocal	signal	in	an	objective	sign	is	









acting.	 This	 dimension	 is	 literally	 utopian,	 since	 man	 is	 constantly	 projected	
beyond	his	own	environment9.	In	the	first	stages	of	this	process,	the	projection	
does	 not	 reach	 a	 specific	 social	 meaning	 and	 still	 less	 the	 realm	 of	 ethics,	
which	 is	 only	 a	 very	 late	 product	 of	 human	 evolution	 and	 culture10,	 but	 one	
may	 conjectures	 that	 this	 utopian	 tension	 has	 been	 already	 prepared	 within	
the	biological	context.	





direction	 to	 meta-environmentality,	 which	can	be	 called	“neo-environmentality”.	 It	 is	
related	 to	 the	 hypostatization	of	 the	counter-movement	pertaining	 the	 technical	act-




the	 hand,	 which	 means	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 technological	 acting;	 ii)	 this	 acting	 is	
symbolic	 since	 it	 is	 based	 on	 the	 paradigmatic	 model;	 iii)	 it	 enables	 a	 long	 chain	 of	
exteriorizations;	 iv)there	 we	 find	 the	 peculiar	 separation	 man-environment,	 but	 the	
symbolic	 character	 of	 the	 technological	 gesture	 paradoxically	 implies	 a	 refill	 of	 that	
distance	 (Cera	 2013,	 181-192),	 since	 the	 tool	 is	 used	 to	 remedy	 a	 biological	 lack;	v)	
machines	are	the	ultimate	expression	of	this	development,	because	they	allow	a	defini-
tive	domination	onto	what	is	supposed	to	be	absolutely	far	from	man.	
10	The	 main	 difference	 between	 Cassirer	 and	 Leroi-Gourhan	 might	 be	 found	 in	 the	
worth	given	to	the	final	goal	of	their	genealogies.	Indeed,	the	ethical	man	has	a	spiritu-
al	primacy	in	Cassirer’s	mind,	and	becomes	the	truly	man,	since	it	reaches	the	realm	of	
Geist and	 his	 transcendent	 disposition (Cassirer	 2004,	 237-255;	 Renz	 2002,	 92-106;	
Bermes	2012,	593-598);	according	to	Leroi-Gourhan,	instead,	the	idea	that	the	ethical	
man	 descends	 from	 his	 twofold	 biological	 roots	 (both	 from	 anatomical	 biology	 and	
from	biology	of	society)	seems	to	be	always	predominant.	





ontology	 is	 an	 ontology	 of	 what	 is	 not	 present,	 since	 the	 beable-content11	is	
evidently	defined	as	a	product	of	reason	in	its	transcendental	and	mathemati-
cal	structure.	Thinking	being	means	 to	 individuate	 the	position	of	 that	being	
among	 the	 other	 beings;	 this	 intrinsic	 mathematical	 character	 of	 knowledge	
compels	us	to	recognize	the	 functionality	of	knowledge,	and	the	 fact	 that	the	
presence	of	being	is	always	a	sort	of	logic	postulate.	The	meta-environmental	
element	is	then	present	in	the	basic	foundation	of	ontology	too.	Notwithstand-
ing,	 it	 is	 in	 An Essay on Man that	 the	 intrinsic	 tension	 toward	 the	 future	 be-
comes	 evident.	 This	 orientation	 is	 accomplished	when	 politics	 and	 ethics,	 as	
forms	of	culture,	are	definitely	sketched.	The	problem	of	moral	acting	is	based	
on	 the	 definition	 of	 previsions	 and	 rules,	 transcending	 the	 punctual	 disposi-
tion	of	experience	as	such.	This	dynamics	finally	ends	with	the	determination	
of	the	regulative	character	of	the	idea	of	Good,	which	works	as	the	polar	star	of	




acting	 is	 directed	 toward	 an	 ungraspable	 foundation	 working	 as	 criterion	 of	
activity.	Of	course,	this	is	an	already	specialized	form	of	acting,	and	it	cannot	be	
used	as	 the	 wellspring	 of	 the	 human	 activity	 as	such.	 However,	 the	 symbolic	
character	of	the	Good	can	be	interpreted	as	the	final	stage	of	a	whole	phenom-
enology,	 whose	 roots	 remount	 the	 first	 development	 of	 the	 technological	 ca-










tion	of	 future	events	and	even	 the	planning	of	 future	actions	are	
not	entirely	beyond	the	reach	of	animal	life.	But	in	human	beings	
the	 awareness	 of	 the	 future	 undergoes	 the	 same	 characteristic	
change	of	meaning	which	we	have	noted	with	regard	 to	 the	 idea	
of	the	past.	The	future	is	not	only	an	image;	it	becomes	an	“ideal”.	












a	 completely	 different	 question.	 The	 human	 acting	 is	 not	 only	 based	 on	 the	
solidification	of	a	memory	and	on	doing	the	right	choice	among	a	class	of	op-
erations,	 but	 in	 its	 cultural	 meaning	 directly	 deals	 with	 an	 utopian	 tension,	
which	 Cassirer	 manifestly	 calls	 “prophetic”.	 From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 reli-
gious	and	ethical	acting	can	be	viewed	as	the	last	stage	of	an	evolution,	which	
began	with	the	setting	of	an	operative	code.	













element	 of	 man’s	 evolution	 (Leroi-Gourhan	 1993,	 187-200);	 accordingly,	 the	
definition	“animal symbolicum”	appears	to	gain	a	fascinating	solidity.	
Let	me	conclude	by	summing	up	the	content	of	a	paragraph	from	Gesture and 












tion	 is	 solely	 that	 of	 manifesting	 interior	 feelings	 or	 needs.	 This	 emotional	










writing	 is	 the	 natural	 and	 decisive	 evolution	 of	 the	 whole	 process.	 Indeed,	
when	men	could	only	speak,	there	was	a	strict	division	between	the	hand	and	
the	facial	pole,	despite	the	fact	that	human	language	has	been	born	in	function	
of	 the	 adaptation	 of	 the	 face	 to	 the	 anatomical	 configuration	 of	 the	 skeleton	
and	to	the	freedom	of	the	hand;	the	rise	of	writing	then	means	a	sort	of	recon-
ciliation	between	hand	and	face,	to	the	point	that	Leroi-Gourhan	clearly	claims	
that	 tools	 and	 words	 are	 the	 product	 of	 the	 same	 human	 faculty12	(Leroi-
Gourhan	1993,	113-114).	Technological	and	symbolical	actions	are	unavoida-
bly	 interconnected	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 human	 evolution,	 and	 one	 can	 say	
that	they	are	solely	two	words	for	the	same	thing.	
	
ii)	 Technology, language and symbolical tension.	 The	 relationship	 between	
technology	and	symbolics	is	so	deep	that	it	precedes	the	rise	of	language	too.	If	




the	 development	 of	 the	 technological	 gesture,	 which	 brings	 us	 to	 think	 that	
Archanthropians	 and	 Palaeoanthropians,	 until	 the	 homo sapiens,	 had	 devel-
oped	 the	 language	 they	could	 speak,	considering	their	own	technological	ex-
pertise.	The	symbolical	tension	of	language	is	the	same	as	that	animating	the	
birth	 of	 technology.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 human	 language	 overcames	
the	 mere	 level	 of	 “vocal	 signals”:	 “Where	 comparative	 studies	 of	 tools	 and	
skulls	tell	us	that	the	rate	of	development	of	industry	corresponded	to	that	of	
biological	development,	language	must	have	been	very	primitive	indeed,	but	it	






The	characteristic	 trait	of	 the	 “language”	and	“techniques”	of	 the	
great	apes	is	that	they	are	resorted	to	spontaneously	in	response	
to	an	external	stimulus	and	are	just	as	spontaneously	abandoned,	
or	 fail	 to	 appear,	 if	 the	 material	 situation	 triggering	 them	 ceases	



















the	 symbolic	 character	 of	 technology	 is	 proved	 by	 the	 mutual	 implication	 of	
gesture	 and	 tool:	 the	 coordination	 of	 both	 originates	 a	 sort	 of	 semiotics	 of	
technology,	and,	even	better,	validates	the	fact	that	technology	itself	is	symbol-
ical.	In	favour	of	the	latter	conclusion,	also	speaks	Leroi-Gourhan’s	integration	
of	 the	 mechanism	 technology-language	 with	 a	 third	 aesthetical	 dimension	
(Leroi-Gourhan	1993,	II,	269-280).	
	
iii)	The unity of the symbolical dimension and the meta-environmental tension of 
human acting. The	 symbolic	 character	 of	 language	 is	 then	 evident	 since	 the	
Neanderthalians,	and	sets	up	the	conditions	of	possibility	of	specific	stages	of	




viz.	a	codified	structure	of	 technological	operations	with	signs.	However,	 it	 is	
once	again	needed	to	stress	the	uniqueness	of	the	symbolical	dimension,	from	
which	 technology	 and	 language	 depart	 as	 branches	 of	 the	 same	 tree.	 Let	me	
conclude	 by	 saying	 that	 the	 meta-environmental	 qualification	 of	 this	 dimen-
sion	is	undoubtedly	upheld	by	Leroi-Gourhan	too:	
We	seem	to	have	lost	nothing	of	what	may	have	been	our	remote	
kinship	 with	 the	 trilobite	 or	 the	 earthworm.	 Every	 element	 of	
psychological	 organization	 that	 the	 vertebrate	 needs	 for	 its	 vital	
balance	 we	 need	 too.	 But	 all	 these	 elements	 are	 the	 steering	
wheel	that	steers	our	vegetative	activity	behind	what	is	particular	
and	peculiar	to	ourselves	alone:	our	symbolizing	faculty	[…],	that	
property	 of	 the	 human	 brain	 that	 consists	 in	 maintaining	 a	 dis-
tance	 between	 lived	 experience	 and	 the	 organism	 that	 serves	 as	
its	 medium.	 The	 problem	 of	 the	 dialogue	 between	 the	 individual	
and	society,	which	has	come	up	in	connection	with	the	question	of	
intelligence	 and	 instinct	 […]	 is	 nothing	 other	 than	 this	 capacity	
human	beings	have	of	distancing	 themselves	 from	their	environ-
ment,	 both	 external	 and	 internal	 (Leroi-Gourhan	 1993,	 II,	 234-
235).	
Nevertheless,	 it	 must	 be	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 “meta-environmentality”	 argu-
ment	 is	 not	 new	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	 philosophical	 anthropology.	 As	 is	 well	
known,	 a	 meta-environmental	 definition	 of	 the	 human	 acting	 has	 been	
stressed	by	Gehlen	in	the	same	years	of	Cassirer	(Gehlen	1988,	24-32).	How-
ever,	 there	 is	 still	 a	 difference	 between	 Cassirer	 and	 the	 great	 philosophical	
anthropologists	and	between	these	ones	and	Leroi-Gourhan’s	approach.	In	the	





first	 case,	 as	 Bermes	has	 pointed	out,	Cassirer	 focuses	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	
technological	acting	as	distinctive	characteristic	of	man,	rather	than	asking	the	
question	 on	 the	 worth	 of	 technology	 for	 men;	 to	 him,	 technology	 is	 not	 the	
answer	to	a	biological	lack,	but	a	specific	and	original	attitude	tied	to	the	sym-
bolic	 faculty	 (Bermes	 2012,	 592).	 In	 Leroi-Gourhan,	 technology	 has	 in	 turn	
manifested	its	biological	root,	so	that,	in	the	light	of	the	biology	of	technology	
and	society,	the	ethical	destination	cannot	be	conceived	as	the	real	human	di-







cally	 founded,	 goes	 downward,	 and	 its	 constitutive	 aspect	 for	 the	 originally	
human	 acting	 seems	 to	 aftwerwards	 imply	 a	 whole	 metabasis eis allo genos 
(Bermes	 2012,	595;	Möckel	2005,	342-343).	 It	 is	correct	 to	state	 that	within	
the	human	acting	there	has	been	a	special	overthrow	of	the	biological	nature,	
but	this	special	upturning	can	never	be	seen	as	a	sort	of	removed	element	of	
the	 identity	of	mankind.	Hence	we	are	obliged	to	review	Cassirer’s	 theory,	 in	
order	to	correct	and	specify	the	phenomenological	aim	of	his	approach.	
9. The Transcendental Grounding of the Human Acting 
	
On	what	basis	a	 transcendental	 foundation	of	 the	human	acting	can	be	 justi-
fied?	In	order	to	answer	this	question,	we	can	give	a	look	at	the	very	source	of	
the	 transcendental	 argument	 on	 acting,	 viz.	 Kant’s	 Kritik der praktischen 








the	 logical	 structure	 of	 the	 moral	 commands	 is	 quite	 clear,	 and	 it	 hardly	 de-
serves	a	comment:	the	choice	of	individuating	the	very	meaning	of	the	acting	
in	the	“categorical	imperatives”	does	not	leave	room	for	uncertainty.	However,	
the	 purity	 of	 moral	 reason	 does	 not	 imply	 the	 annihilation	 of	 the	 biological	
dimension,	insofar	as	the	sensitive	stimuli	are	not	deleted,	but	they	rather	re-






ence	 the	 sensitive	 world	 of	 our	 feelings	 or	 needs;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 we	 con-
sciously	decide	to	withhold	it	after	having	tasted	its	inflammatory	roots.	Hence	
the	“withholding”	of	the	natural	world	within	the	moral	acting	is	far	from	im-





world	 for	 each	 stage	 of	 the	 acting.	 Considering	 the	 whole	 range	 of	 Leroi-
Gourhan’s	 and	 Cassirer’s	 theories,	 we	 may	 envisage	 a	 progressive	 empower-













the	 belonging	 of	 man	 to	 nature:	 even	 in	 his	 first	 steps	 on	 Earth,	 man	 ap-
pears	to	be	a	vector	of	freedom,	since	his	biology	involves	a	special	impulse	
for	the	overcoming	of	the	biology	of	nature.	Kant	himself,	 in	Anthropologie in 
pragmatischer Hinsicht,	 conceived	 the	 technological	 disposition	 as	 the	 first	
characteristic	moment	of	the	human	identity,	together	with	the	pragmatic	dis-
position	and	the	moral	one;	he	even	explicitly	admitted	that	the	human	reason	
is	 somehow	 shaped	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 form	 and	 of	 the	 organization	 of	 the	
hand	(see	the	starting	quote	of	the	paper:	Kant	1880,	255),	since	the	structure	
of	the	latter	seems	to	imply	a	sort	of	indetermination,	which	prepares	man	to	







the ground and 
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degree two: the 
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evolution The rise of 
society, also 
thanks to the 
technological 
evolution, allows 
us to conceive 
society itself as a 
specific body, 











respect of the 
philetic one, to 
the point that 
within the ethical 
acting the 
dimension of the 
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The world of 
culture is the 
final stage of the 
biology of 
society, so that 
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dominating	 reality	 through	 intelligence,	 which	 then	 in	 its	 first	 meaning	 is	
technology.	It	is	not	by	chance,	indeed,	that	the	reason	is	something	we	use	in	











ing	 the	 hand	 of	 the	 painter.	 There	 the	 symbolic	 nature	 of	 our	 being	 in	 the	
world	is	completely	explained.	At	the	same	time,	the	shape	of	the	human	biol-





the	consolidation	of	 the	meaning	of	 the	action	as	an	 independent	element	of	









contrary,	 we	 seek	 a	 condition	 of	 possibility	 in	 the	 biological	 framework,	 in	 order	 to	
show	that	the	function	of	symbolization	is	already	at	work	in	the	deepest	roots	of	our	
physiological	 origin.	 The	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 a priori, starting	 from	 the	 invariants	
within	the	mythical	stories,	is	certainly	an	interesting	and	fruitful	attempt	at	building	a	







tie	 the	 empirical	 and	 the	 rational	 sphere,	 arguing	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 general	 form	 of	
acting,	whose	inner	disposition	is	strictly	symbolic,	since	its	biological	beginning.	It	is	
solely	why	 the	 freedom	of	 the	hand	from	the	ground	 is	already	symbolic,	 that	 in	 the	
world	 of	 culture	 we	 can	 recognize	 those	 peculiar	 liberations	 leading	 man	 into	 the	
realm	of	the	a priori	as	a	ultimate	expression	of	that	ancient	freedom.	










the	 technological	 gesture.	 The	 external	 paradigmatic	 idea	 is,	 in	 this	 case,	 the	
presumption	of	an	idea	of	Justice,	whose	name	is	not	as	important	as	its	plain	
existence	 –	 it	 might	 be	 called	 “God”	 and	 nothing	 would	 change	 –:	 as	 in	 the	
technological	dimension	we	tried	to	adequate	the	tools	to	their	function,	in	the	
ethical	actions	we	seek	the	moral	perfection	through	the	attempt	of	adapting	
our	 acting	 to	 Justice	 or	 Good.	 Between	 the	 goals	of	 the	 technological	 actions	











of	 “virtue”	 and	 “happiness”)14,	 the	 technological	 actions	 cannot	 completely	
adapt	themselves	to	the	idea	of	the	acting.	The	creation	of	a	chopper	does	not	
exhaust	 the	 general	 idea	 of	 cutting,	 just	 as	 a	 good	 action	 does	 not	 mean	 the	
totality	 of	 the	moral	 acting.	 If	 we	 were	 able	 to	refill	 that	 distance,	 the	acting	
would	cease	in	the	stasis	of	a	pure	contemplation	and	the	dynamical	spirit	of	
life	would	be	annihilated.	
The	 transcendental	status	of	 the	acting	does	mean	the	 inexhaustibility	of	ac-
tion:	we	have	a	paradigmatic	model,	that	we	cannot	touch	with	our	own	hands,	
and	that	works	as	a	sort	of	horizon	we	will	never	able	to	walk	on.	The	function	
of	 the	 paradigm	 consists	 of	 its	unachievable	 essence	 and	 compels	 us	 to	 con-
stantly	seek	the	perfect	adaptation	of	our	will	to	the	contempt	of	the	abstract	
																																																													




existence	 of	 immortal	 substances	 (soul	 and	 God),	 but	 they	 solely	 imply	 the	 urgent	












graspable	we	will	continue	our	research	 to	embrace	 it.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	 re-
markable	that	this	capacity	of	setting		an	independent	goal	from	the	sensitive	





the	 fact	 that	 we	 cannot	 remember	 those	 old	 times	 in	 which	 flavours	 were	
pleasanter	 than	ever,	does	 not	mean	that	everything	has	been	 lost	under	 the	
frozen	 ground	 of	 a	 betrayed	 youth	 of	 the	 spirit.	 The	 biological	 memory	 has	










elaborates	 a	 theory	 of	 the	 spiritual	 acting,	according	 to	 which	 the	 plastic	ca-
pacity	 of	 technological	 action	 implies	 a	 symbolical	 tension.	 Tools	 witness	
above	 all	 a	 “Grundrichtung des Erzeugens”	 (basic	 direction	 of	 the	 producing),	




sirer	 points	 out	 that	 man	 is	 at	 the	 same	 time	 “vernünftig”	 (reasonable)	 und	
“werkzeugbildend”	(creator	of	 tools),	as	though	the	definition	of	man	as	“ani-
mal rationale”	or	“animal symbolicum”	and	that	of	“homo technologicus”	were	
two	manifestations	 of	 the	same	attitude,	 intended	as	 the	unity	of	an	“Akt des 
‘Fassens’” (act	of	grasping)	or	as	 “bildendes Gestalten”	 (creative	 forming).	The	
consolidation	of	the	relationship	between	the	technological	and	the	symbolical	
sphere	 is	 confirmed	 by	 the	 consideration	 of	 the	 paradigmatic	 model	 of	 the	
																																																													
15	From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 definition	 of	 “culture”	 is	 exhaustive:	 “Die Hervor-
bringung der Tauglichkeit eines vernünftiges Wesens zu beliebigen Zwecken überhaupt 
(folglich in seiner Freiheit) ist die Kultur:	The	creation	of	the	suitability,	to	a	reasonable	
being,	for	the	setting	of	a	goal	at	will	(namely	in	his	freedom)	is	culture”	(Kant	1922,	
511).	







In	 its	 pure	 logical	 form,	 all	 thought	 is	 mediated.	 It	 is	 directed	 to	
the	discovery	and	extraction	of	a	mediating	structure,	which	joins	
the	opening	sentence	and	the	ending	sentence	of	a	communicative	
chain.	The	 tool	 fulfils	 the	same	 function,	 represented	here	 in	 the	
logical	 sphere,	 in	 the	 objective	 sphere	 of	 physical	 objects.	 [...]	 It	
sets	 itself	 between the	 first	 positions	 taken	 by	 the	 will	 and	 its	
goal.	 Only	 in	 this	 in-between	 position	 is	 it	 permitted	 to	separate	
them	and	set	them	at	a	proper	distance.	As	long	as	the	human	be-
ing	 makes	 use	 only	 of	 his	 limbs,	 his	 bodily	 “organs”,	 in	 order	 to	
achieve	 his	 goals,	 such	 distancing	 is	 not	 yet	 reached.	 […]	 In	 the	
tool	and	 its	application,	however,	 the	goal	 sought-after	 is	 for	 the	
first	 time	 moved	 off	 into	 the	 distance.	 Instead	 of	 looking	 spell-
bound	 at	 this	 goal,	 the	 human	 being	 learns	 to	 “fore-see”	 it.	 This	
form	 of	 seeing	 is	 all	 that	 distinguishes	 human	 intentional	 doing	
from	 animal	 istinct.	 The	 “fore-seeing”	 establishes	 “fore-thought”	
(Die «Ab-Sicht» begründet die «Voraus-Sicht»).	 It	 establishes	 the	
possibility	 of	 directing	 attention	 to	 a	 goal,	 towards	 something	
spatially	absent	and	temporally	remote,	rather	than	acting	on	an	
immediately	 given	 sensuous	 stimulus.	 It	 is	 not	 so	 much	 because	
animals	are	inferior	to	the	human	in	bodily	skill.	But	because	this	
line of sight is	 denied	 to	 animals,	 there	 is	 no	 genuine	 tool	 use	 in	
the	area	of	animal	existence	(Cassirer	2012,	30-31).	
The	resemblances	of	Cassirer’s	quote	to	Leroi-Gourhan	are	quite	evident.	The	





of	 the	 constitutive	 role	 of	 technology	 and	 lead	 to	 a	 phenomenology	 which,	
from	 the	 tool	 to	 the	 machines,	 realizes	 the	 maximal	 exteriorization	 (Leroi-





directly	on	its	ontological	status,	but	 the	 two	aspects	are	obviously	 intercon-
nected:	 the	paradigm	is	a	 form,	but	 the	 form	is	 tied	 to	 the	goal	 that	must	be	
accomplished	through	the	 tool.	The	position	of	 the	paradigm/goal	 finally	en-
tails	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	 meta-environmental	 tension:	 future	 becomes	
henceforward	the	specific	dimension	of	human	temporality	as	consequence	of	
this	 meta-environmental	 disposition	 and	 of	 the	 symbolic	 nature	 of	 human	







In	 conclusion,	 one	 must	 say	 that	 palaeontology	 has	 deeply	 confirmed	 the	
worth	of	Cassirer’s	definition	of	“animal	symbolicum”,	but	it	has	also	showed	
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Man and Future: A Palaeontological and Chronological Foundation of Cassirer’s 
Definition of Man As “Animal Symbolicum” 
Abstract.	In	the	present	paper,	the	author	aims	at	laying	the	foundations	of	a	
symbolics	 of	 technical	 gesture,	 according	to	 the	 thesis	 that	 symbolic	 faculty	
is	 another	 face	 of	 the	 technological	 one,	 and	 that	 they	 are	 both	 in	 truth	 two	
sides	of	the	same	coin.	Accordingly,	the	author	suggests	to	rename	the	whole	
dimen-sion	 as	 “meta-environmentality”.	 The	 analysis	 is	 carried	 out	 on	 the	
basis	 of	 a	 specific	 comparison	 between	 Cassirer’s	 definition	 of	 “animal 
symbolicum”	 and	 its	 scientific	 consistence	 in	 the	 light	 of	 modern	
palaeontology.	“Animal symbol-icum”	 is	 here	 compared	 with	 Leroi-Gourhan’s	
homo	 technologicus,	 and	Cassi-rer’s	 ideas	 on	 human	 identity	 tested	 starting	
from	 paleoanthropological	 data.	The	result	of	the	inquiry	lead	us	to	recognize	
the	 urgency	 of	 integrating	 Cassi-rer’s	 argument	 with	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	
technological	capacity,	but	a	deep	anal-ysis	 of	 the	 characterizing	 attributes	
of	 the	 latter	 compels	 us	 to	 uphold	 the	 symbolic	 attitude	 of	 the	
technological	dimension.	The	author	then	sketches	a	basic	 description	 of	 the	
guidelines	 of	 a	 symbolic	 theory	 of	 technology	 (espe-cially	 §§	 6-7),	 and	 tries	
to	 show	 how	 the	 basic	 elements	 of	 such	 an	 approach	were	 familiar	 both	 to	
Cassirer	 and	 Leroi-Gourhan.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 whole	 theory,	 the	
author	 elaborates	 a	 chronological	 analysis	 of	 human	 identity,	 whose	 basic	
result	 is	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 future	 as	 main	 temporal	 dimen-sion	 of	
human	acting.	
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